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What's on the Ballot

Senate Joint Resolution 11 (SJR 11) would add a new Article XIII, titled "Taxation Limitations," to the Iowa Constitution. If approved by voters, it would require a two-thirds supermajority in both chambers of the Iowa General Assembly to pass any bill that:

  • Increases state individual income tax
  • Increases state corporate income tax
  • Increases any other state tax based upon income or legal and special reserves
  • Establishes a new state tax on any type of income or legal and special reserves

Under current law, tax rate changes require only a simple majority (50%+) vote in each chamber. The amendment would not apply to state taxes (like sales, property, gas, alcohol, etc.), or any tax imposed at the option of a local government.

Arguments For and Against

Arguments In Favor

Protecting Taxpayers from Future Rate Increases

Supporters argue Iowa has cut income tax rates substantially in recent years and that a constitutional supermajority makes it harder for a future legislative majority to reverse those cuts. Requiring broader agreement prevents rapid swings in tax policy.

Aligning Iowa with Other Low-Tax States

Fifteen states have some form of legislative supermajority requirement to increase taxes. Supporters cite this as evidence that supermajority requirements are a mainstream tool for maintaining a competitive tax environment.

Building Broader Legislative Consensus

Supporters argue that requiring two-thirds agreement forces cross-party consensus on tax increases and makes narrow, partisan tax hikes more difficult. They frame this as a procedural check on legislative power.

Arguments Against

Constraining Future Legislatures & Recessions

Critics argue that constitutional amendments lock in current policy against the judgment of future voters and future legislatures. During recessions or natural disasters, when tax adjustments may be necessary to fund essential services, a supermajority requirement could constrain the state's ability to respond.

Shifting Costs to Fees, Property Taxes, and Users

Research on other supermajority states finds that legislatures respond to tax restrictions by increasing fees, tuition, and other non-tax revenues, and by reducing aid to local governments. This has resulted in property taxes increasing to compensate. Critics argue this shifts the tax burden from higher earners to students, homeowners, and users of state services.

Impact on State Credit Ratings

Bond rating agencies have cited a state's flexibility to raise revenue as a factor in credit ratings. For example, Moody's specifically cited supermajority requirements when downgrading Arizona in 2010 and Nevada in 2011 general obligation bonds. Critics argue Iowa could face similar borrowing costs.

Similar Amendments in Practice

Fifteen U.S. states have some form of constitutional or statutory supermajority requirement for tax increases. Below are examples of how similar bills have impacted their states.

Missouri's Hancock Amendment

Missouri passed the Hancock Amendment in 1980, requiring tax increases above a specified threshold to be approved by voters, not legislative supermajority. Assessments of Hancock's effect differ. Supporters credit it with restraining state revenue growth. Critics point to its erosion through court rulings and legislative workarounds, the state's ongoing reliance on fees and local property taxes to fund services, and pressures on Missouri's public education and infrastructure funding.

Colorado's TABOR

Colorado's Taxpayer Bill of Rights (TABOR) is the most-studied US example of a state-level constitutional restriction on taxation. Non-partisan research generally finds TABOR has succeeded at restraining state revenue growth while contributing to Colorado's decline in national rankings for K-12 per-pupil spending, higher education funding, and infrastructure investment relative to peer states.

Broader Cross-State Evidence

The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities analyzed tax revenue data from 41 states over three decades (1980–2009) and found that states with strict supermajority requirements levy taxes at nearly identical levels as other states, on average. In both groups, state and local taxes remained flat as a share of personal income over the period studied. This finding suggests that supermajority requirements have not measurably lowered long-term tax burdens compared to peer states without them, though they may affect the pace and timing of tax changes.

How to Vote on SJR 11

A "YES" Vote

A yes vote is in favor of adding the two-thirds supermajority requirement to the Iowa Constitution. Future increases to state income tax rates, corporate income tax rates, or new taxes on income would require two-thirds approval from both chambers of the Iowa General Assembly rather than a simple majority.

A "NO" Vote

A no vote would leave current rules in place. State income tax rate changes and new income taxes would continue to require only a simple majority vote in each chamber of the Iowa General Assembly, as with most other legislation.

The official ballot language voters will see may differ from the amendment title used here. The Iowa Secretary of State typically publishes the official ballot summary 60–90 days before the general election. This page will be updated with the official ballot language once it is published.

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